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1. Introduction
In recent years, the analysis of banking services’ prices in Italy has focused on loan interest rates
rather than deposit rates. This may be explained with the attention for the restrictive effects of monetary
policy and by the differences on variations in loan prices across Italian regions, particularly between the
South and the Center – North.
2
In this paper we focus on bank deposit rates because they are still one of the main ways in which
Italian households invest their financial wealth. We consider the rates charged by banks in the provinces.
The empirical analysis is based on a large panel data set (more than 10,000 observations) for the years
1990-99.
Examining the determinants of deposit interest rates, this paper compares alternative econometric
packages for the estimation of the panel data. With our abundance of observations, many different
specifications have been estimated using the fixed-effects and the random-effects models. The purpose of
this work is to respond to the caveats about numerical accuracy raised by McCullogh and Vinod in the
June 1999 issue of the Journal of Economic Literature. The authors were very concerned about the scarce
attention paid to numerical accuracy in the selection of econometric packages. This choice might drive the
market by placing CPU (Central Processing Unit) performance before precision. Considering this
treacherous trade-off, we decided to compare the numerical values of the estimates of some popular
econometric software.
The paper is divided into six sections. Section two surveys the literature on factors influencing interest
rates on deposits, with particular reference to the USA, where the largest number of studies has been
conducted. Section three presents the data used in the regressions and the hypotheses we tested. Section
four discusses some econometric results of the determinants of interest rates on total deposits, current
accounts, savings accounts and certificates of deposit. Section five compares the numerical value of the
estimates of three of the most popular econometric packages featuring built-in panel data estimation
algorithms: LIMDEP, STATA and TSP. As a numerical benchmark we used Modeleasy Plus, a general-
purpose language containing matrix operations. Finally, Section six states the main conclusions. Appendix 1
documents some program listings we built. Appendix 2 describes the data used in the regressions.3
2. A survey of the literature
In the USA the debate on bank interest rates is characterized by two points of view. According to
the first view, market concentration is an important factor influencing banks’ interest rates. According to the
second view, the link between traditional measures of competition and banking prices disappeared with the
deregulation of the banking system.
The first view developed from the Supreme Court decision, in the 1963 case Philadelphia National
Bank, to consider banking markets “local” rather than national, a decision which highly influenced
subsequent interpretations by the antitrust authorities. The idea that banking rates are influenced by market
concentration has been confirmed by the structure-conduct-performance paradigm – see Gilbert (1984)
and Weiss (1989) for surveys on the subject – and lastly in many papers by Berger and Hannan. They
focus their analysis on the retail deposit market. Berger and Hannan (1989a, 1989b and 1991) find a
negative relationship between concentration and deposit rates. The results are similar if the Herfindahl index
or concentration ratios are used to measure market power.
3 Sharpe (1997) also finds that concentration
impacts negatively on deposit rates.
To evaluate the effect of recent bank mergers in the USA, Prager and Hannan (1998) compare the
prices charged by banks involved in mergers to those that are not. The result is that the deposit rates of
merged banks decline more than those of other banks because of their greater market power. Neumark
and Sharpe (1992) estimate a dynamic model to study the role of concentration in influencing changes in
deposit rates following money market rate variations; they find that banks in concentrated markets reduce
deposit rates faster and increase them slower because of their market power. In the USA particular
attention is given to the California banking market, where deposit rates are usually lower than in other states
(the so-called California rate mystery).
4 Neuberger and Zimmerman (1990), checking for the effect of
other variables (growth rate of deposits, branch number, average wage of bank employees) find that higher
concentration is one of the factors leading to lower deposit rates in California.
                                                                 
2 See, inter alia, Angeloni, Buttiglione,  Ferri and Gaiotti (1995),  D’Auria and Foglia (1997), De Bonis and
Ferrando (1997).
3 Hannan (1997) discusses the pros and cons of the Herfindahl index.
4 See Freixas and Rochet (1998).4
The second viewpoint is that the relationship between concentration and deposit rates is not negative.
Jackson (1992) has criticized the Berger and Hannan results, arguing that the relation between
concentration and deposit rates is not linear, but  U-shaped. At first, deposit rates decrease as
concentration increases. But at a certain point greater concentration implies higher rates, because of the
intense competition in markets dominated by a few banks.
5 However, oligopolistic  behavior is constrained
by the possibility of new entrants to the markets, according to the mechanism described by the contestable
market theory.
This approach leads us to consider the effect on the market of potential competition from new
entrants, rather than focusing on the relationship among the incumbents.
  6 This position results from
skepticism towards the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, which has been criticized on different
grounds. One criticism is that concentration cannot be considered exogenous because it is influenced by the
prices charged by firms: in the case of deposits, for example, higher interest rates should lead to gains in
market share.
Critics of the relationship between concentration and deposits’ compensation add that banking
deregulation and the wave of mergers have caused the notion of local markets to blur (see Osborne,
1992). The view that geographic markets are local was formed in the 1960’s when unit banking – banks
consisting of a single office – was common and branching was heavily restricted in many US states
(Radecki, 1998). Now it seems that concentration at the local level – usually measured by the metropolitan
statistical areas (MSA) – is no longer relevant to interest rates paid on retail  deposits. According to
Radecki, the uniformity of  bank deposit and loan rates across an entire state suggests that state boundaries
now approximate the shape and extent of retail markets better than the MSA. In contrast, concentration at
the state level affects deposit rates. The increase in bank size, the development of banking holding
companies and the trend towards interstate banking explain why markets are growing larger in geographical
scope. Moore (1998) also claims that banking market borders are wider today than in the past.
In Italy the debate is similar. Within the earlier framework characterized by entry barriers to local
markets, due to limits in branch openings and mergers, Biscaini, Carosio and Padoa Schioppa (1972) were
the first to find that deposit rates were more upwardly rigid than money market rates. These results were in
                    
5 In response, Berger and Hannan (1992) confirm the robustness of their estimates but recognize that the
relationship between concentration and rates is time-variant.
6 Allen, Saunders and Udell (1991) do not find a statistically significant influence of concentration on banking
fees.5
accordance with the Monti-Klein model, in which the bank is price-maker in the deposit and loan markets.
Conigliani and Lanciotti (1979) found a negative correlation between concentration and deposit rates.
More recently, in the new situation of liberalized banking markets, Italian studies have pursued some
subjects which recall the American literature. Pittaluga (1994) criticized the structure-conduct-performance
approach, because in Italy non-price competition became more important in recent years. More precisely,
urban banks applied price competition in the deposit market; while rural banks mostly used forms of non-
price competition, such as enlarging their branch network.  Corbisiero and  Pesaresi (1999) studied
competition in the provinces in which large mergers had been concluded. These merges caused an initial
increase in concentration followed by a subsequent decrease. This result stems from the redistribution of
market shares from the merged banks to new entrants which adopt more aggressive strategies. The merged
bank increases its market share only if it applies higher rates on deposits. This paper, like others in USA,
emphasizes the role of the new competitors in influencing the incumbents’ behavior.
Looking at macro data, deposit rates seem more upwardly rigid than money market rates in Italy as
well. Figure 1 shows that in the years 1995-98 rates on current accounts and certificates of deposit with a
maturity of six months slowly followed the increases in six-month Treasury bill rates; on the contrary,
deposit rates were quick to follow reductions in Treasury bills’ yields (the only exception concerns some
months in 1995). This phenomenon is stronger for current accounts, while CD rates appear more reactive
to market conditions
7.
In this paper, however, attention is focused on micro data, whose analysis appears to be of interest
even on the basis of the few Italian studies on the same subject.
3. The data and the hypotheses to test
The data on interest rates have been taken from the Central Credit Register. A sample of banks
produce quarterly data on deposit and loan interest rates. Deposit rates consider deposits of residents in
lire greater than 20 million lire (about 10,000 €).
In this paper, the data refer to the 95 Italian provinces and consider around 45 banks.
8 The
dependent variables in the regressions are the interest rates on current accounts, savings accounts,
                    
7 On bank deposits in Italy see Cesarini, Conti, Di Battista (1994) and Di Battista (1996).
8 The sample contains 41 banks in 1990, 46 in 1991, 47 in 1992, 47 in 1993, 47 in 1994, 47 in 1995, 46 in 1996,
45 in 1997, 44 in 1998, 43 in 1999. Mergers are mainly responsible for these annual changes.6
certificates of deposits, total deposits. The certificates of deposit rate, the only one with an agreed maturity
among those studied, is generally the highest; the savings accounts normally have the lowest rates. All the
rates were raised during the summer of 1992 and the first half of 1995, because of the restrictive monetary
policy adopted in those years to counter the foreign exchange crises that occurred.
The analysis considers the years 1990-99; some additional regressions focus on the period 1990-96.
Between 1990 and 1996, current accounts were equal on average to 50 per cent of total deposits (Table
1); deposits redeemable at notice decreased from 24 to 12 per cent; certificates of deposit increased from
24 to 35 per cent. In contrast, the years 1997-99 saw a strong increase in the share of current accounts
and a contraction in that of certificates of deposit, after the changes in the fiscal treatment of CDs in June
1996.
9 At the end of 1999, current accounts rose to 76 per cent of total deposits, while CDs fell to 12 per
cent.
Independent and dependent variables are computed with reference to the Italian provinces. The
discussion on the definition of the relevant banking market is cumbersome. The choice of the province is
motivated by the large availability of data for this geographic area; it is more difficult to collect data on
banks on a municipal basis. Moreover, the province is considered the relevant market in deposits for
antitrust banking activity in Italy.
The first variable that we use to measure concentration is the Herfindahl index for deposits. Another
variable we use is the concentration ratio for the first three banks in the province (R3, the sum of their
market shares). The concentration of banking markets decreased considerably in the nineties. As other
indicators of competition and diffusion of financial services we use the number of banks and branches in
each province.
10
Different control variables are used in the literature to check for the effect of concentration on interest
rates. In this paper we use per capita income in the provinces, which is an indicator of the degree of
economic development
11 and the growth rate of deposits in each province, which may influence the return
offered on deposits.
12
                    
9 See Banca d’Italia, (1996).
10 Neuberger and Zimmerman (1990), for example, use as regressors the number of banks, together with the
concentration ratio R3.
11 Radecki (1998), Berger and Hannan (1989a and 1989b) and (1991), Moore (1998) use the per capita GDP
as variable influencing deposits’ interest rates.
12 Neuberger and Zimmerman (1990), Radecki (1998), Moore (1998) utilize this variable as regressor.7
Other control variables consider banks’ costs, which may influence deposit rates. The simple idea is
that banks consider the whole structure of costs when they fix deposit rates. In this paper we consider two
aggregates: the ratio between costs and total assets and the average staff costs per employee.
13
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2, together with the correlation coefficients of the
independent variables. As expected we get a negative correlation between the concentration indicators and
the number of banks and branches in the provinces.
14
4. Econometric results
Table 3 reports the estimates for the dependent variable of the interest rate on total deposits. We
consider the years 1990-99. The regressions contain yearly dummy variables to control the effects on
deposit rates of changes in the monetary policy stance and the business cycle. Dummies are significant,
indicating the importance of the evolution of rates over time.
The Herfindahl index does not have a statistically significant influence on deposit rates. A negative
effect is produced, however, by the concentration ratio R3. It seems that only the market shares of the
most important banks in each province are relevant for the level of interest rates.
Average staff costs per employee (COSPER) have a negative effect on the remuneration of deposits:
the higher the value of this variable, the lower the deposit rate.
15 The negative sign of COSPER (Table 3) is
also found in a regression in which it is used as the only variable together with HER (Table 4).
The number of banks per province (NBANKS) has a positive effect on deposit rates (Table 3): a
larger number of banks may correspond to a higher degree of competition or diffusion of financial services,
leading to a higher return for depositors.
                                                                 
13 Neuberger and Zimmerman (1990) find a negative influence of the average wage on deposits’
remuneration; Berger e Hannan (1988) find a coefficient with a positive sign. Other variables which could
influence the deposits’ remuneration are the interbank position and banks’ securities issues; we do not deal
with these variables now.
14 Appendix 2 describes the variables used in the regression.
15 This is the same result of Neuberger and Zimmerman (1990)’s paper. The ratio costs/total assets
(COSRAT) has a positive coefficient (tab. 3). We offer two interpretations of this result. First, banks with
high costs are not able to reduce them in the short period; therefore, they increase their funding to enlarge the
scale of operations. Second, inefficient banks (i.e. with higher costs) are subject to a greater failure risk;
therefore, they must pay a premium to attract deposits. In a regression where COSRAT is used as regressor
with HER, however, the former variable is not statistically significant (table 4).8
The deposit growth rate and provincial per-capita income do not influence deposit rates. It seems
that only banking variables exert any influence.
Cross-sections (Table 5) for the period 1990-99 confirm that the Herfindahl index does not influence
interest rates for most of the years examined. We also split our sample, considering the five macro-regions
(NorthWest, NorthEast, Center, South, Sicily and Sardinia). In this respect Table 6 shows that the
Herfindahl index negatively influences deposit rates only in the provinces in the NorthWest and the Center,
while the concentration ratio R3 is statistically significant only in the NorthEast and Center. The statistical
significance of concentration indicators is accepted only at the 10 per cent level. These regressions also
seem to confirm a weak effect of concentration on deposit rates.
Many American studies distinguish the analysis of current account rates from the examination of time
or saving deposit rates. This paper also tries to distinguish between the different technical forms of deposits.
In the years 1990-96, concentration negatively affects current account rates (Table 7), but not the returns
on CDs (Table 8) and deposits redeemable at notice (in the latter case we do not report the results). With
reference to certificates of deposit, the result may depend on their fast reaction to variations in money
market yields.
We further investigated the determinants of current account rates, running regressions on cross
sections for the years 1990-96 (Table 9). The regressions show that the Herfindahl index negatively
influences current account deposit rates only in 1990-91;
16 in the following years, perhaps as a
consequence of the 1990 liberalization of branching in Italy, concentration does not affect deposit rates
negatively.
17 The other control variables maintain their statistical significance.
Coming back to the American debate, it is possible to conclude that the evidence for Italy appears to
be nearer to those studies which criticize the Berger and Hannan papers. First, concentration does not
influence deposit rates in the period 1990-99. Second, the relationship between concentration and rates
seems to vary over time.
In the next section we turn to the analysis of different econometric software for the estimation of
panel data.
                    
16 The concentration ratio R3 is statistically significant only in 1990.
17 On the contrary, the second part of table 9 shows that if the Herfindahl index and the number of banks are
used as regressors, the two variables have both a positive and statistically significant coefficient in the years
1993-96. The result corresponds to the efficiency market view, according to which a higher concentration
may imply a larger deposits’ remuneration, because of the intense competition between the few oligopolists.9
5. Comparison between some econometric packages
The last two decades have shown a rapid development of software packages featuring complex
estimation procedures, without the need for in-depth knowledge of the numerical algorithms and computer
science. Most of the econometric and statistical software packages commonly used in academic and
business environments have both an interactive and a programmable interface. The main selection criteria
for these products are:
1) usability;
2) richness of the commands most frequently required;
3) cost.
18
To the authors’ knowledge there has been only one Panel Data software review in the recent past;
this is the paper “Software review” by Pierre Blanchard, in “Econometrics of Panel Data”, 1992. The
justification for our work is twofold:
a) the impressive pace at which these packages have developed in the last decade;
b) the lack of numerical applications in Blanchard’s paper.
Unlike Blanchard, we did not take into account the RATS software package because it does not
address the panel data estimation problem in a straightforward way.
Quite often, for a number of different reasons, the numerical accuracy of the answer supplied by the
software is overlooked or even neglected. McCullogh and Vinod (1999) gave some examples in which the
numerical answers produced by alternative econometric and statistical packages are completely different
19.
Given the importance of this issue, it has become the economist’s responsibility to validate the results. The
natural question that arises is how to evaluate the numerical accuracy of a complex algorithm. The very
simple idea, adopted in this paper, is to compare the results obtained using three different econometric
packages available in the research department of the Bank of Italy. The packages compared are:
                    
18 In this paper we do not address this issue.
19 The authors do not mention the name of the packages used.10
1) Time Series Processor (TSP) from TSP Intl. (California);
2) STATA from STATA Corp. (Texas);
3) LIMDEP from Econometrics Ltd. (NY University).
From the usability standpoint, it is important to stress that these packages have been developed in
the academic environment to meet special research needs, giving less weight to the user interface, which so
far is essentially a simple character interface. These packages are adopted in advanced university lectures
and learning to use them represents an important sunk cost for researchers; this gives the usability an
idiosyncratic element overriding the weight of objective differences.
As far as the availability of panel estimation commands is concerned, it is possible to verify an
overlapping of the three packages examined.
The algorithms required in this paper for the panel estimation, i.e. the fixed and random effects
estimators, can be easily interpreted as Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimates; for this purpose it is
sufficient to evaluate the error variance-covariance matrix.
Even though it is possible to perform an interactive estimation, in order to preserve the ability to
reproduce the exercises, it has been decided to use programs written in the languages native to the
packages. The code relative to these three programs is shown at the end of Appendix 1. A simple visual
inspection of the code shows the similarity of the packages considered, as witnessed by the number of lines
of code and the output produced. In the use of the STATA package some statistical tests must be explicitly
requested.
The main goal of this comparison was to validate the numerical results. As can be checked from the
tables shown in Appendix 1, this goal has been fully reached. The numerical value of the estimated
coefficients for the fixed and random effects models have been checked by writing the estimation algorithms
using the Speakeasy-Modeleasy Plus environment, a package featuring a compact expression for matrix
processing.
20 It is important to mention the fact that the output of STATA also presents a value for the
constant. It is, of course, irrelevant for the fixed effects estimator. In fact, after the slope estimation, this












                    
20 Modeleasy Plus, EMCC (Palm Harbor, Florida)11
The fixed effect estimator assumes the same numerical value for all three packages. The numerical
differences present in the random effects estimation are due to the different criteria adopted for the variance
component estimation. Maddala and Mount (1973) offer a comprehensive survey on the estimation
methods for the variance component models.
Our analysis focuses on the one-way model in which there is no time-only component in the
disturbance term.
Given the following model  i it it it T t N i u X y , , 1 ; , , 1
' K K = = + + = b a , where the
disturbance term can be decomposed in the following way:   it i it u n m + =  and 
2 2 2
n m s s s + = u , and
assuming that the idiosyncratic elements  i m are random, the estimation of this model consists of the
application of the Ordinary Least Squares technique to the following transformed model:
( ) ( ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - + ￿ ￿ - + - ￿ = ￿ - i i it i i it i i i it u u X X y y q b q q a q
' ' 1
where the bar over the variable represents its temporal average. Let us assume the following:
n s  is the standard deviation of the fixed effects estimation (within the regression);
2 2
1 n s s s - = tot  and 
2
tot s is the variance of the pooled regression (OLS) achieved with
TSP, if this happens to be negative TSP resorts to the large sample formula given by
( ) NOBS SSR SSR Within OLS / 1 - = s  where  SSR stands for residuals sum of squares and
NOBS  is the total number of observations;
2
1
~ s  is the following standard deviation computed with LIMDEP:
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ols b  is the pooled OLS coefficient vector;
 Nfirmis the number of different groups;
 k is the number of explanatory variables;
 depending on certain numerical conditions  ols b  can be replaced by  between b  ;
1 ˆ s  is the following standard deviation computed with STATA;
( ) T between / , 0 max ˆ
2 2
1 n s s s - = , where T is the harmonic mean of the set of  i T .
It is clear that all the numerical differences produced by the random effect estimate are caused by the
difference of the small sample formula for the computation of the between-regression variance. The










































Although the three estimators are asymptotically equivalent, they show different small-sample
properties.
21
The three software packages have been used to estimate 5 possible model specifications adopting
both fixed and random effects. The execution times (on a Risk6000 990 platform) and program sizes are









On the issue concerning the numerical differences of the random effects estimates, we have analyzed
the comparative efficiency of the small-sample properties of the three estimators. This task has been
accomplished by running a parametric bootstrap procedure starting from the OLS estimation residuals in
one selected specification
22. The parametric bootstrap used in this exercise is not a bootstrap in the usual
sense of the word, it consists in the Monte Carlo exercise described in the following seven steps:
                    
21 On this subject see Swamy and Arora (1972).
22 See Bellmann, Breitung and Wagner (1989).13
1)  run a pooled OLS estimation of the coefficients in order to get a numerical value for the
residuals;
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3) run a control random effect estimation for computing the true estimated model; this task is
carried out separately for each package and provides a true value for the dependent variable and for the
structural coefficients;
4) generate two random samples drawn from two normal distributions with zero mean and the
standard deviations computed in step 2;
5) add the two simulated residuals to the true value of the dependent variable computed in
step 3; in this way it is simulated a new draw for the dependent variable;
6) perform a random effect estimation using this new dataset;
7) compute the average and the standard deviation of the replications.
In what follows the previous seven-step algorithm will be referred to as MCA1 (Monte Carlo A1).
A first interesting result from the application of MCA1 is the CPU time required for the completion
of the Monte Carlo experiment. This is shown in the following graph where we compare execution time
versus number of replications for the Monte Carlo exercises. TSP is the fastest software.
                    
23 See Wallace and Hussain (1969) for the balanced panel case.14
In order to have comparable results, the programs for the Monte Carlo experiments have been
written using the looping features made available by each package.
5.2 Bias and Monte Carlo Variability
The second and more important insight gained from the application of MCA1 is the evaluation of a
bias and a standard deviation for the Monte Carlo replications for each of the packages examined.
The following graphs show the behavior of the bias and the standard deviation around the Monte


















































































































































































1) the data generation process is supplied by using the fitted value of the random effect estimate for
each of the three packages;
2) each package has used its own random number generator;
3) the total panel length has been kept fixed.
Taking into account these experimental conditions, observation of the graphs permits some
interesting considerations:
•  TSP and STATA show about the same behavior for the normalized bias, which appears to
approach zero, and the Monte Carlo volatility, which approaches a constant value;
•  LIMDEP shows a slightly different behavior: a non zero bias with a variability comparable to the
variability generated by TSP and STATA
6. Conclusions
This paper compares alternative econometric packages by analyzing the determinants of deposit
interest rates in the Italian banking system. The dependent variables are bank interest rates on total
deposits, current accounts, and certificates of deposit. We consider the influence on interest rates of the
Herfindahl index, the concentration ratio R3, the number of banks in each province, the growth rate of
deposits, the ratio between banking costs and total assets, and average staff costs per employee. With this
abundance of panel data, many different specifications have been estimated using the fixed-effects and
random-effects models. Our purpose was to find an answer to the caveats about numerical accuracy
raised by McCullogh and Vinod in the June 1999 issue of the Journal of Economic Literature. They
were very concerned about the little attention paid to numerical accuracy in the selection of econometric
packages.
The first conclusion of the paper is that the Herfindahl index does not influence deposit interest rates
in a panel regression for the years 1990-99; at the same time, the concentration ratio R3 has a negative
effect on deposit remuneration. With regard to current accounts, we found a negative effect of
concentration in the years 1990-96; cross section regressions show that this result derives mainly from the
years 1990-91, when branching was first liberalized. Concentration does not affect interest rates on
certificates of deposit and savings deposits. We also found a positive effect of the number of banks per
province on deposit rates and a negative effect of average staff costs per employee. Banks seem to take
into account their overall structure of costs when deciding the returns to pay on deposits.18
With regard  to the numerical comparison of estimators in the three packages examined, fixed-effects
algorithms are numerically the same to the available decimal places. Random-effects algorithms yield slightly
different results because of the different methods used to compute the between-regression variance. In this
respect, we have achieved a more confident outcome than that envisaged by McCullogh and Vinod.
In addition, we compared the relative efficiency of the random-effects algorithms provided by the
three packages. This was done by means of a set of suitably designed Monte Carlo experiments, varying
the time span and the number of provinces considered. The outcome of this exercise is asymptotic
equivalence between STATA and TSP, whereas LIMDEP shows a persistent bias up to about one
thousand Monte Carlo replications.
The three econometric software packages are equivalent as regards both usability and numerical
accuracy. TSP seems to be the fastest and the simplest to work with; LIMDEP displays immediately a
more thorough range of statistical tests; STATA probably offers the greatest variety of estimation
commands. The crucial factor in deciding which package to use thus appears to be the experience
researchers have already gained.19
Appendix 1. Program listing
TSP Code
OPTIONS CRT NODATE MEMORY=6.4 SIGNIF=9;
? Unbalanced panel data estimation
SMPL 1 8322;
READ (FILE='ccpatit',FORMAT=FREE)
ABIPRO ANNO RATE HERFIN SHARE3 CCGROW NBRANCH NBANKS COSRAT PILPRO TITCUST;
FREQ(PANEL, ID=ABIPRO) A;
DUMMY (EXCLUDE) ANNO ANN90-ANN95;
LIST REGR1 = HERFIN COSRAT ANN90-ANN95;
LIST REGR2 = HERFIN COSRAT NBANKS ANN90-ANN95;
LIST REGR3 = COSRAT NBANKS ANN90-ANN95;
LIST REGR4 = SHARE3 COSRAT ANN90-ANN95;
LIST REGR5 = SHARE3 COSRAT NBANKS ANN90-ANN95;
PANEL(NOBYID,ID=ABIPRO,WITHIN,NOTOT,NOBET,VARCOM) RATE C REGR3;
LIMDEP Code
? Limdep program for evaluating the determinants of the deposit rate
? on the checking account
read; nobs=8322; nvar = 11;




? create the yearly dummy variables.
create  ;ann90=anno=1990;ann91=anno=1991;ann92=anno=1992;ann93=anno=1993;
ann94=anno=1994;ann95=anno=1995 $
create  ; tp = anno - 1990 $
namelist; regr1=herfin, cosrat, ann90,ann91,ann92,ann93,ann94,ann95$
namelist; regr2=herfin, cosrat,nbanks, ann90,ann91,ann92,ann93,ann94,ann95$
namelist; regr3 =cosrat,nbanks, ann90,ann91,ann92,ann93,ann94,ann95$
namelist; regr4=share3, cosrat, ann90,ann91,ann92,ann93,ann94,ann95$
namelist; regr5=share3, cosrat,nbanks, ann90,ann91,ann92,ann93,ann94,ann95$
regress ; lhs=rate; rhs=regr3; str=abipro; perido = tp; panel$
STATA Code
* lettura files
infile abipro anno rate herfin share3 ccgrow nbranch nbanks cosrat pilpro
 titcust using ccpatit. , clear







local regr1 "herfin cosrat ann90 ann91 ann92 ann93 ann94 ann95"
local regr2 "herfin cosrat nbanks ann90 ann91 ann92 ann93 ann94 ann95"
local regr3 "cosrat nbanks ann90 ann91 ann92 ann93 ann94 ann95"
local regr4 "share3 cosrat ann90 ann91 ann92 ann93 ann94 ann95"
local regr5 "share3 cosrat nbanks ann90 ann91 ann92 ann93 ann94 ann95"
xtreg rate `regr3', fe i(abipro)
xtreg rate `regr3', re i(abipro) th
xttest0
xthaus
The above program listings show only the first of the 5 estimation commands. The following tables also
show the output containing the results of the first estimation:
TSP Version 4.4 OUTPUT
EXECUTION
Current sample:  1 to 7165, 7243 to 8322
                       PANEL DATA ESTIMATION
                       =====================
 Unbalanced data:  NI=  1307, TMIN=    1 TMAX=    7, NOB=   8245
 WITHIN (fixed effects) Estimates:
 Dependent variable: RATE
        Mean of dep. var. = 6.008486356
   Std. dev. of dep. var. = 1.394531738
 Sum of squared residuals = 2361.804409
    Variance of residuals = .3408087170
 Std. error of regression = .5837882467
                R-squared = .8526842637
       Adjusted R-squared = .8247516696
             LM het. test = 21.98008642 [.000]
            Durbin-Watson = 1.606400250 [.000,.000]
            Estimated        Standard
 Variable  Coefficient         Error           t-statistic       P-value
 COSRAT    12.09587104       2.207111014       5.480408988       [.000]
 NBANKS    .7692621677E-02   .3997860076E-02   1.924184822       [.054]
 ANN90     2.405859480       .0278008801       86.53896821       [.000]
 ANN91     2.349755038       .0273895121       85.79032101       [.000]
 ANN92     2.900834885       .0261248276       111.0374749       [.000]
 ANN93     .9376989611       .0270357743       34.68363625       [.000]21
 ANN94     .2078109186       .0251020549       8.278641708       [.000]
 ANN95     1.061031859       .0235980764       44.96264182       [.000]
 Variance Components (random effects) Estimates:
 VWITH (variance of Uit)   = .34081
 VBET  (variance of Ai)    = .42730
 (computed from small sample formula)
 THETA (0=WITHIN, 1=TOTAL) = .10229
 (evaluated at TMAX =    7)
 Dependent variable: RATE
        Mean of dep. var. = 6.008486356
   Std. dev. of dep. var. = 1.394531738
 Sum of squared residuals = 6387.212931
    Variance of residuals = .7755236682
 Std. error of regression = .8806382164
                R-squared = .6016887144
       Adjusted R-squared = .6013018166
             LM het. test = 98.56427090 [.000]
            Durbin-Watson = .5944021688 [.000,.000]
            Estimated        Standard
 Variable  Coefficient         Error           t-statistic       P-value
 COSRAT    19.31537278       1.802406350       10.71643627       [.000]
 NBANKS    .9442362215E-02   .1018982787E-02   9.266459000       [.000]
 ANN90     2.357793776       .0266570424       88.44918895       [.000]
 ANN91     2.297395120       .0263338342       87.24119320       [.000]
 ANN92     2.854901040       .0251893972       113.3374099       [.000]
 ANN93     .8854899542       .0257697692       34.36157883       [.000]
 ANN94     .1720995513       .0244361201       7.042834572       [.000]
 ANN95     1.042947192       .0234800782       44.41838659       [.000]
 C         3.920533084       .0558821081       70.15721522       [.000]
 Hausman test of H0:RE vs. FE:  CHISQ(8) = 72.034,  P-value = [.0000]
Limdep Version 7.0 OUTPUT
 +=======================================================================+
 : LIMDEP Estimation Results
 : Sample was reset SAMPLE 1-7165,7243-8322$:
 : Current sample contains 8245 observations.:
 +=======================================================================+
 +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
 | OLS Without Group Dummy Variables                                     |
 | Ordinary    least squares regression    Weighting variable = ONE      |
 | Dependent variable is RATE      Mean =    6.00849, S.D. =      1.3945 |
 | Model size: Observations =    8245, Parameters =   9, Deg.Fr.=   8236 |
 | Residuals:  Sum of squares =    6326.1039, Std.Dev. =          .87642 |
 | Fit:        R-squared =  .60541, Adjusted R-squared =          .60503 |
 | Model test: F[  8,   8236] = 1579.56,    Prob value =          .00000 |22
 | Diagnostic: Log-L = -10607.0057, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =  -14440.5947 |
 |             Amemiya Pr. Crt.=     .769, Akaike Info. Crt.=      2.575 |
 | Panel Data Analysis of RATE       [ONE way]                           |
 |           Unconditional ANOVA (No regressors)                         |
 | Source      Variation        Deg. Free.     Mean Square               |
 | Between       4478.58             1306.         3.42923               |
 | Residual      11553.7             6938.         1.66528               |
 | Total         16032.3             8244.         1.94472               |
 +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
 Variable  Coefficient   Standard Error  b/St.Er. P[|Z|>z]   Mean of X
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------
   COSRAT      31.131          1.4090       22.095    .00000   .2759E-01
   NBANKS      .90128E-02      .51991E-03   17.335    .00000   25.55
   ANN90       2.2087          .37649E-01   58.665    .00000   .1216
   ANN91       2.1643          .37082E-01   58.365    .00000   .1300
   ANN92       2.7416          .35932E-01   76.301    .00000   .1460
   ANN93       .76425          .36114E-01   21.162    .00000   .1474
   ANN94       .80676E-01      .35486E-01    2.273    .02300   .1500
   ANN95       .97733          .34982E-01   27.938    .00000   .1544
   Constant    3.6932          .44046E-01   83.848    .00000
+======================================================================+
 : LIMDEP Estimation Results :
 : Current sample contains 8245 observations.:
+======================================================================+
 +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
 | Least Squares with Group Dummy Variables                              |
 | Ordinary    least squares regression    Weighting variable = ONE      |
 | Dependent variable is RATE      Mean =    6.00849, S.D. =      1.3945 |
 | Model size: Observations =    8245, Parameters = ***, Deg.Fr.=   6930 |
 | Residuals:  Sum of squares =    2361.8043, Std.Dev. =          .58379 |
 | Fit:        R-squared =  .85268, Adjusted R-squared =          .82475 |
 | Model test: F[***,   6930] =   30.53,    Prob value =          .00000 |
 | Diagnostic: Log-L =  -6545.2768, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =  -14440.5947 |
 |             Amemiya Pr. Crt.=     .395, Akaike Info. Crt.=      1.907 |
 | Estd. Autocorrelation of e(i,t)     .002549                           |
 | Estd. Autocorrelation of e(i,t)     .002549                           |
 +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
 Variable  Coefficient   Standard Error  b/St.Er. P[|Z|>z] Mean of X
   --------------------------------------------------------------------
   COSRAT      12.096          2.2071        5.480    .00000   .2759E-01
   NBANKS      .76928E-02      .39979E-02    1.924    .05433   25.55
   ANN90       2.4059          .27801E-01   86.539    .00000   .1216
   ANN91       2.3498          .27390E-01   85.790    .00000   .1300
   ANN92       2.9008          .26125E-01  111.037    .00000   .1460
   ANN93       .93770          .27036E-01   34.684    .00000   .1474
   ANN94       .20781          .25102E-01    8.279    .00000   .1500
   ANN95       1.0610          .23598E-01   44.963    .00000   .1544
 +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
 |                Test Statistics for the Classical Model                 |
 |                                                                        |
 |        Model            Log-Likelihood    Sum of Squares    R-squared  |23
 | (1)  Constant term only   -14440.59456       .160323D+05     .0000000  |
 | (2)  Group effects only   -13090.06861       .115537D+05     .2793479  |
 | (3)  X - variables only   -10607.00559       .632610D+04     .6054141  |
 | (4)  X and group effects   -6545.27672       .236180D+04     .8526843  |
 |                                                                        |
 |                                Hypothesis Tests                        |
 |               Likelihood Ratio Test                F Tests             |
 |          Chi-squared   d.f.  Prob.         F    num. denom. Prob value |
 | (2) vs (1)  2701.052   1306     .00000     2.059 1306  6937     .00000 |
 | (3) vs (1)  7667.178      8     .00000  1579.565    8  8236     .00000 |
 | (4) vs (1) 15790.636   1314     .00000    30.526 1314  6930     .00000 |
 | (4) vs (2) 13089.584      8     .00000  3371.348    8  6930     .00000 |
 | (4) vs (3)  8123.458   1306     .00000     8.907 1306  6930     .00000 |
 +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+========================================================================+
 : LIMDEP Estimation Results
 : Current sample contains 8245 observations.:
+========================================================================+
             +--------------------------------------------------+
             | Random Effects Model: v(i,t) = e(i,t) + u(i)     |
             | Estimates:  Var[e]              =   .340809D+00  |
             |             Var[u]              =   .444638D+00  |
             |             Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)] =   .566095      |
             | Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) = 6620.14 |
             | ( 1 df, prob value =  .000000)                   |
             | Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman)     =   69.77 |
             | ( 8 df, prob value =  .000000)                   |
             | Estd. Autocorrelation of e(i,t)     .002718      |
             | Reestimated using GLS coefficients:              |
             | Estimates:  Var[e]              =   .341339D+00  |
             |             Var[u]              =   .452900D+00  |
             |             Sum of Squares          .638894D+04  |
             |             R-squared               .601495D+00  |
             +--------------------------------------------------+
   Variable  Coefficient   Standard Error  b/St.Er. P[|Z|>z]   Mean of X
   ---------------------------------------------------------------------
   COSRAT      19.139          1.8129       10.557    .00000   .2759E-01
   NBANKS      .94458E-02      .10359E-02    9.119    .00000   25.55
   ANN90       2.3591          .26680E-01   88.423    .00000   .1216
   ANN91       2.2987          .26358E-01   87.213    .00000   .1300
   ANN92       2.8561          .25209E-01  113.296    .00000   .1460
   ANN93       .88679          .25796E-01   34.377    .00000   .1474
   ANN94       .17299          .24449E-01    7.076    .00000   .1500
   ANN95       1.0434          .23483E-01   44.434    .00000   .1544
   Constant    3.9245          .56392E-01   69.594    .00000
STATA   6.0  OUTPUT
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs   =   8245
Group variable (i) : abipro                Number of groups   =      1307
R-sq: within  = 0.7956              Obs per group: min =         124
      between = 0.1493                                avg =       6.3
      overall = 0.5956                                max =         7
  F(8,6930)          =   3371.35
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.0159  Prob > F   = 0.0000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
    rate |    Coef. Std. Err.     t     P>|t|        [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  cosrat |  12.09587 2.207111     5.480   0.000      7.769256   16.42248
  nbanks |  .0076926 .0039979     1.924   0.054      -.0001444    .0155297
  ann90  |  2.405859  .0278009   86.539   0.000      2.351361    2.460358
  ann91  |  2.349755  .0273895   85.790   0.000      2.296063    2.403447
  ann92  |  2.900835  .0261248  111.037   0.000      2.849622    2.952048
  ann93  |  .9376989  .0270358   34.684   0.000       .8847006    .9906973
  ann94  |  .2078109  .0251021    8.279   0.000       .1586032    .2570186
  ann95  |  1.061032  .0235981   44.963   0.000      1.014772    1.107291
  _cons  |  4.123241  .1158895   35.579   0.000      3.896062    4.350419
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
 sigma_u |  .72386072
 sigma_e |  .58378825
     rho |  .60590264   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0: F(1306,6930) =  8.91  Prob > F = 0.0000
. xtreg rate `regr3', re i(abipro) th
Random-effects GLS regression            Number of obs = 8245
Group variable (i) : abipro              Number of groups = 1307
R-sq:  within  = 0.7953    Obs per group: min = 1
       between = 0.1679                   avg = 6.3
       overall = 0.6017                   max = 7
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian               Wald chi2(8) =  27010.51
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
------------------- theta --------------------
  min      5%       median        95%      max
0.3355   0.4677     0.6814     0.6814   0.6814
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
    rate |   Coef.    Std. Err.     z     P>|z|       [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+-----------------------------------------------------------------
  cosrat | 19.27733   1.810264    10.649   0.000     15.72928    22.82539
  nbanks | .0094431   .0010258     9.206   0.000     .0074327    .0114536
  ann90  | 2.358083   .0267447    88.170   0.000     2.305664    2.410501
  ann91  | 2.297686   .0264207    86.965   0.000     2.245903     2.34947
  ann92  | 2.855151   .0252717   112.978   0.000      2.80562    2.904683
  ann93  | .8857715   .0258555    34.259   0.000     .8350957    .9364473
  ann94  | .1722926   .0245146     7.028   0.000     .1242448    .2203404
  ann95  | 1.043054   .0235535    44.285   0.000     .9968903    1.089218
  _cons  | 3.921392   .0561647    69.819   0.000     3.811311    4.03147325
-------- +----------------------------------------------------------------
 sigma_u |  .65647679
 sigma_e |  .58378825
     rho |  .55840665   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
. xttest0
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects:
        rate[abipro,t] = Xb + u[abipro] + e[abipro,t]
        Estimated results:
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
                ---------+-----------------------------
                    rate |   1.944719       1.394532
                       e |   .3408087      .58378825
                       u |   .4309618      .65647679
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                              chi2(1) =  6620.14
                            Prob>chi2 =     0.0000
. xthaus
Hausman specification test
            ---- Coefficients ----
         |      Fixed       Random
    rate |    Effects      Effects       Difference
---------+-----------------------------------------
  cosrat |   12.09587     19.27733        -7.181465
  nbanks |   .0076926     .0094431        -.0017505
   ann90 |   2.405859     2.358083         .0477767
   ann91 |   2.349755     2.297686         .0520688
   ann92 |   2.900835     2.855151         .0456835
   ann93 |   .9376989     .8857715         .0519274
   ann94 |   .2078109     .1722926         .0355183
   ann95 |   1.061032     1.043054         .0179776
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
   chi2(  8) = (b-B)'[S^(-1)](b-B), S = (S_fe - S_re) =  80.62
             Prob>chi2 =     0.000026
Appendix 2. The data
The data refer to the larger part of those banks which belong to the sample producing quarterly
information for the Central Credit Register on deposit interest rates. Tha data set have been arranged
considering the individual code of each bank and the province where it is active. Outliers have been
corrected or erased.
The data set on total deposit interest rates refers to the years 1990-99 and contains 10561
observations. The data set on current accounts contains, for the period 1990-96, 8237 observations. The
data set on certificates of deposit includes, for the period 1990-96, 8.017 observations. The data set on
savings accounts includes 8248 observations.
The dependent variables are the different interest rates for the categories of deposits. Independent
variables include the provincial Herfindahl indices and the concentration ratios R3 for the different
categories of deposits; these indicators have been built considering all the Italian banks except for the
mutual banks. The data set also consider the number of banks and branches per province; the costs/assets















(percentages; end of period data)
Deposits in lire
Year Current Savings Certificates of deposit Total
Accounts Deposits of which:
Short-term long-term
1974 55.23 40.98 3.79 0.00 3.79 100.00
1975 48.93 47.14 3.93 0.00 3.93 100.00
1976 48.79 47.82 3.39 0.00 3.39 100.00
1977 48.89 47.76 3.35 0.00 3.35 100.00
1978 50.55 46.05 3.40 0.00 3.40 100.00
1979 52.40 44.67 2.93 0.00 2.93 100.00
1980 53.24 43.89 2.88 0.00 2.88 100.00
1981 52.38 44.26 3.35 0.00 3.35 100.00
1982 51.21 43.52 5.26 0.00 5.26 100.00
1983 51.01 43.44 5.55 0.84 4.71 100.00
1984 51.20 42.00 6.80 1.73 5.06 100.00
1985 51.16 41.02 7.82 2.73 5.09 100.00
1986 52.89 37.83 9.28 4.07 5.20 100.00
1987 53.35 35.67 10.98 5.63 5.35 100.00
1988 52.85 31.14 16.01 7.25 8.76 100.00
1989 52.90 26.85 20.25 8.50 11.75 100.00
1990 52.02 23.71 24.27 9.95 14.32 100.00
1991 53.09 19.66 27.25 9.89 17.36 100.00
1992 50.66 16.97 32.36 10.83 21.53 100.00
1993 50.28 15.42 34.29 9.50 24.80 100.00
1994 51.79 14.71 33.51 7.77 25.73 100.00
1995 51.05 12.66 36.29 6.30 29.99 100.00
1996 52.80 11.97 35.23 6.98 28.25 100.00
1997 61.66 13.12 25.22 9.77 15.45 100.00
1998 69.97 12.98 17.06 8.41 8.65 100.00




Current account rate 6.01 1.98 10.79
CD interest rate (%) 9.19 1.12 14.50
Savings account interest rate 5.95 1.00 11.27
Deposits interest rate (%) 7.02 2.72 10.97
Herfindahl index 0.18 0.06 0.46
Concentration ratio (R3,%) 62.0 33.0 96.0
Branches per province 264 11 1834
Banks per province 25 4 115
Costs/total assets (%) 2.75 0.58 5.12
Staff costs per employee
(euro)
51797 34119 82894
Per capita provincial income (in
lire)
25.7 mil. 11mil. 43mil.
Correlations (1990-99)






Branches per provinces -0.30 -0.33 1
Banks per province -0.37 -0.38 0.66 1
Costs/total assets -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.02
Staff costs per employee 0.01 -0.01 0.08 -0.04
Costs/total assets Staff costs per
employee
Costs/total assets 1
Staff costs per employee -0.15 1
Summary Statistics for the Five Italian Macroregions: 1990-1999
(number of observations and average values of the variables)
NorthWest NorthEast Center South Islands Italy
Number of observations 2980 2899 2117 1689 876 10561
Deposits’ interest rate (%) 5.92 5.88 5.74 5.52 5.45 5.77
Herfindahl index 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.20
Concentration ratio 59.7 68.1 67.1 60.2 67.3 64.2
Banks per province 27.3 27.4 25.7 16.4 14.1 24.330
Costs/assets (%) 2.75 2.69 2.72 2.67 2.66 2.71
Staff costs per employee (euro) 53425 53596 54030 54322 54511 5382731
Table 3
DETERMINANTS OF DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES
PANEL ESTIMATION, 1990-99
Dependent variable: banks’ deposit rate in each province.
Independent variables: Herfindahl index for deposits’ market shares (HER); concentration ratio (R3), i.e.
sum of the first 3 banks’ market shares per province; staff costs per employee (COSPER); costs/total
assets (COSRAT); number of banks per province (NBANKS). Variables refer to end-of-year data, for
the period 1990-99. Regressions include time dummy variables, whose coefficients are not reported. t –
statistics in brackets. * Significant at 1 per cent. ** Significant at 5 per cent. *** Significant at 10 per cent.













R3 -0.33 *** -0.36 **
(-1.92) (-2.05)
NBANKS 0.0028 * 0.0028 * 0.0029 *
(3.91) (3.93) (3.97)
COSPER -6.48 * -6.47 * -6.35 * -6.36 * -6.34 *
(-4.50) (-4.49) (-4.41) (-4.41) (-4.40)
COSRAT 4.05 * 4.06 * 3.94 ** 3.91 ** 3.92 **
(2.35) (2.35) (2.29) (2.27) (2.28)
Number of
observations
10561 10561 10561 10561 10561
R
2 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Sum squared
residuals
2839.1 2838.22 2834.67 2834.43 2833.38
Hausman test 136.87 139.47 137.86 139.33 143.6532
Table 4
DETERMINANTS OF DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES
PANEL ESTIMATION, 1990-99
Dependent variable: banks’ deposit rate in each province.
Independent variables: Herfindahl index for deposits’ market shares (HER); staff costs per employee
(COSPER); costs/total assets (COSRAT). Variables refer to end-of-year data, for the period 1990-99.
Regressions include time dummy variables, whose coefficients are not reported. t – statistics in brackets. *


















Hausman test 100.9 13133
Table 5
DETERMINANTS OF DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES
CROSS-SECTIONS (OLS), 1990-99
Dependent variable: banks’ deposit rate in each province.
Independent variables: Herfindahl index for deposit market shares (HER); staff costs per employee (COSPER);
costs/total assets (COSRAT); number of banks per province (NBANKS). Variables refer to end-of-year data, for
the period 1990-95. t – statistics in brackets. * Significant at 1 per cent. ** Significant at 5 per cent. *** Significant
at 10 per cent.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
HER 0.14 0.23 -0.21 0.35 -0.07 -0.11
(0.54) (0.98) (-0.6) (1.44) (-0.31) (-0.43)
COSPER 23.31 * 25.77 * 43.92 * -4.79 *** -20.35 * -6.23
(2.81) (3.82) (5.12) (-1.72) (-4.95) (-1.31)
COSRAT -28.75 * -10.75 ** 1.68 16.77 * -16.32 * 13.72 *
(-5.25) (-2.11) (0.27) (3.03) (-3.70) (2.74)
COSTANT 7.62 * 6.98 * 6.60 * 6.33 * 7.45 * 6.98 *
(29.44) (26.17) (15.69) (35.11) (34.11) (28.20)
N. observat. 804 928 1088 1115 1150 1177
R
2 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,05 0,01
Sum squared
residuals
404 388 1260 646 576 740
     (i) (ii)      (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
HERF 0.42 0.40 0.16 0.33 -0.04 0.36
(1.49) (1.62) (0.44) (1.28) (-1.17) (1.25)
NBANKS 0.01 * 0.01 ** 0.01 * -0.01 0.01 0.01 *
(2.69) (2.02) (3.63) (-0.3) (0.37) (3.68)
COSPER 21.46 ** 24.66 * 43.13 * -4.80 **
*
-20.33 * -5.60
(2.59) (3.65) (5.05) (-1.72) (-4.94) (-1.18)
COSRAT -27.79 * -10.14 ** 1.26 16.70 * -16.27 * 13.13 *
(-5.08) (-1.99) (0.20) (3.01) (-3.69) (2.63)
COSTANT 7.47 * 6.88 * 6.35 * 6.35 * 7.43 * 6.72 *
(28.37) (25.48) (14.97) (32.94) (32.56) (26.25)
N. observat. 804 928 1088 1115 1150 1177
R
2 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01
Sum squared
residuals
400 386 1245 646 576 732
                                                                                                                             (follows)34
Table 5 (follows)
DETERMINANTS OF DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES
CROSS-SECTIONS (OLS), 1990-99
Dependent variable: banks’ deposit rate in each province.
Independent variables: Herfindahl index for deposit market shares (HER); staff costs per employee
(COSPER); costs/total assets (COSRAT); number of banks per province (NBANKS). Variables refer to
end-of-year data, for the period 1996-99. t – statistics in brackets. * Significant at 1 per cent. ** Significant at
5 per cent. *** Significant at 10 per cent.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1996 1997 1998 1999
HER 0.22 0.25 0.39 ** 0.46 *
(1.11) (1.22) (2.26) (3.08)
COSPER -37.44 * -12.89 * -25.80 * -15.42 *
(-10.39) (-3.29) (-7.43) (-7.02)
COSRAT -47.66 * -33.72 * -38.24 * -1.76
(-8.71) (-7.86) (-11.09) (-0.72)
COSTANT 9.25 * 5.97 * 4.76 * 2.38 *
(33.92) (22.62) (20.36) (16.69)
N. observat. 1175 1022 1056 1046
R




438 335 259 184
     (i) (ii)      (iii) (iv)
1996 1997 1998 1999
HERF 0.21 0.35 0.61 * 0.47 *
(0.95) (1.59) (3.21) (2.83)
NBANKS -0.01 0.01 0.01 * 0.01
(-0.15) (1.23) (2.79) (0.08)
COSPER -37.47 * -12.48 * -25.44 * -15.40 *
(-10.38) (-3.17) (-7.35) (-6.95)
COSRAT -47.65 * -33.75 * -38.64 * -1.77
(-8.70) (-7.87) (-11.23) (-0.72)
COSTANT 9.26 * 5.88 * 4.63 * 2.38 *
(33.19) (21.60) (19.44) (15.66)
N. observat. 1175 1022 1056 1046
R
2 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.05
Sum squared
residuals
438 335 257 18435
Table 6
DETERMINANTS OF DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES: ITALIAN MACROREGIONS
PANEL ESTIMATION, 1990-99
Dependent variable: banks’ deposit rate in each province.
Independent variables: Herfindahl index for deposit market shares (HER); concentration ratio (R3), i.e.
sum of the first 3 banks’ market shares per province; staff costs per employee (COSPER); costs/total
assets (COSRAT). Variables refer to end-of-year data, for the period 1990-99. Regressions include time
dummy variables, whose coefficients are not reported. t – statistics in brackets. * Significant at 1 per cent.
** Significant at 5 per cent. *** Significant at 10 per cent. Fixed-effects regressions, selected according to
the Hausman test.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
North-West North-East Center South Islands
HER 1.21 *** 0.51 -1.35 ** -0.19 -0.19
(1.78) (0.97) (-2.12) (-0.25) (-0.20)
COSPER 0.74 -7.55 * -6.50 * -18.29 * -20.86 *
(0.28) (-2.67) (-2.09) (-4.88) (-3.80)
COSRAT -2.38 1.66 1.57 14.57 * 31.02 *
(-0.79) (0.49) (0.41) (2.97) (4.74)
N. observat. 2980 2899 2117 1689 876
R
2 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94
Sum squared
residuals
693.57 718.66 611.79 482.01 246.68
Hausman test 75.63 92.69 23.11 25.53 32.67
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
North-West North-East Center South Islands
R3 0.44 -0.64 *** -0.93 *** -0.10 -1.42
(1.60) (-1.77) (-1.83) (-0.22) (-1.51)
COSPER 0.64 -7.39 * -6.61 ** -18.29 * -20.36 *
(0.24) (-2.61) (-2.12) (-4.88) (-3.72)
COSRAT -2.51 1.63 1.64 14.54 * 29.75 *
(-0.84) (0.48) (0.43) (2.97) (4.58)
N. observat. 2980 2899 2117 1689 876
R
2 0,95 0,95 0,94 0,94 0,94
Sum squared
residuals
693,74 718,03 612,16 482,01 245,94
Hausman test 76,15 97,96 22,55 25,80 33,0936
Table 7
DETERMINANTS OF CURRENT ACCOUNTS INTEREST RATES
PANEL ESTIMATION, 1990-96
Dependent variable: current accounts’ rates in each province.
Independent variables: Herfindahl index for current accounts’ market shares (HER); concentration ratio
(R3), i.e. sum of the first 3 banks’ market shares per province; staff costs per employee (COSPER);
costs/total assets (COSRAT); number of banks per province (NBANKS). Variables refer to end-of-year
data, for the period 1990-96. Regressions include time dummy variables, whose coefficients are not
reported. t – statistics in brackets. * Significant at 1 per cent. ** Significant at 5 per cent. *** Significant at
10 per cent.















R3 -0.99 * -0.94 *
-3.65 -3.42
NBANKS 0.007 ** 0.007 *** 0.006
(1.98) (1.75) (1.51)
COSPER -8.68 * -8.57 * -8.83 * -8.77 * -8.66 *
(-4.21) (-4.16) (-4.28) (-4.25) (-4.20)
COSRAT 19.47 * 19.33 * 19.66 * 19.58 * 19.43 *
(6.57) (6.53) (6.64) (6.61) (6.56)
N. observat. 8237 8237 8237 8237 8237
R
2 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
Sum of squared
residuals
2342.05 2338.77 2341.96 2341.01 2338.00
Hausman test 47.30 53.81 49.43 58.50 76.7037
Table 8
DETERMINANTS OF CERTICATES OF DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES
PANEL ESTIMATION , 1990-96
Dependent variable: rates on certificates of deposit  in each province.
Independent variables: Herfindahl index for market shares of certificates of deposit (HER); concentration
ratio (R3), i.e. sum of the first 3 banks’ market shares per province; staff costs per employee (COSPER);
costs/total assets (COSRAT); number of banks per province (NBANKS). Variables refer to end-of-year
data, for the period 1990-96. Regressions include time dummy variables, whose coefficients are not
reported. t – statistics in brackets. * Significant at 1 per cent. ** Significant at 5 per cent. *** Significant at
10 per cent.















NBANKS 0.009 0.009 0.01
(1.33) (1.22) (1.51)
COSPER 12.93 * 12.76 * 12.80 * 12.84 * 12.63 *
(3.16) (3.12) (3.13) (3.14) (3.09)
COSRAT -19.54 * -19.35 * -19.35 * -19.41 * -19.18 *
(-3.29) (-3.25) (-3.25) (-3.26) (-3.23)
N. observat. 8017 8017 8017 8017 8017
R
2 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
Sum squared
residuals
7641.80 7641.81 7641.49 7640.10 7639.20
Hausman test 66.63 66.73 65.69 68.05 67.4938
Table 9
DETERMINANTS OF CURRENT ACCOUNTS’  INTEREST RATES
CROSS-SECTIONS (OLS), 1990-96
Dependent variable: banks’ rates on current accounts in each province.
Independent variables: Herfindahl index for current accounts’ market shares (HER); staff costs per employee
(COSPER); costs/total assets (COSRAT); number of banks per province (NBANKS). Variables refer to end-of-
year data, for the period 1990-96. t – statistics in brackets. * Significant at 1 per cent. ** Significant at 5 per cent.
*** Significant at 10 per cent.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
HER -0.81 ** -0.56 *** -0.60 0.02 -0.42 -0.24 0.08
(-2.44) (-1.81) (-1.42) (0.06) (-1.46) (-0.76) (0.30)
COSPER -1.55 -1.05 -33.83 * -15.08 * -31.08 * -11.03 * -33.10
(-0.20) (-0.15) (-3.94) (-5.89) (-7.13) (-2.29) (-8.12)
COSRAT 7.05 *** 23.16 ** 59.86 * 45.04 * 36.87 * 53.31 * 9.33
(1.86) (6.87) (12.52) (12.68) 10.22 (13.70) (2.26)
COSTANT 7.02 * 6.47 * 7.62 * 5.07 * 5.63 * 5.01 * 6.44
(24.86) (20.81) (17.32) (32.37) (24.09) (18.75) (23.20)
N. observat. 1002 1071 1203 1214 1236 1271 1240
R
2 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.05
Sum squared
residuals
724.10 681.35 1650.21 824.40 783.32 988.92 636.63
     (i) (ii)      (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
HERF 0.21 0.33 0.70 0.86 * 0.66 ** 0.89 * 1.00
(0.58) (0.97) (1.50) (2.62) (2.10) (2.62) (3.48)
NBANKS 0.009 * 0.007 * 0.01 * 0.008 * 0.01 * 0.01 * 0.01
(6.25) (5.59) (6.49) (5.76) (7.70) (7.60) (7.73)
COSPER -3.55 -1.96 -33.06 * -13.96 * -29.02 * -9.18 *** -31.19
(-0.47) (-0.29) (-3.91) (-5.50) (-6.80) (-1.95) (-7.81)
COSRAT 6.94 *** 22.51 * 57.99 * 44.53 * 36.15 * 51.54 * 7.29
(1.86) (6.77) (12.31) (12.70) (10.25) (13.51) (1.80)
COSTANT 6.69 * 6.16 * 7.07 * 4.66 * 5.06 * 4.43 * 5.95
(23.72) (19.81) (16.04) (27.47) (21.11) (16.32) (21.38)
N. observat. 1002 1071 1203 1214 1236 1271 1240
R
2 0.04 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.09
Sum squared
residuals
696.75 661.90 1594.06 802.36 747.29 945.70 607.2139
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